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 Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law:
 Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in
 Taiwan
 Jane Kaufman Winn
 This article looks at one component of Taiwan's development experience,
 the informal financing techniques used by small businesses, to clarify the inter-
 action between the formal Republic of China (ROC) legal system and the net-
 work structure of Taiwanese society. The ROC legal system has supported the
 economic development process directly by regulating economic activity, and
 indirectly by facilitating the networks of relationships that also regulate eco-
 nomic activity. The relational structure of traditional, rural Chinese society has
 survived in a modified form in modem Taiwan, and this modem form selec-
 tively blends elements of the modem legal system, networks of relationships,
 and the enforcement services of organized crime. Ideas such as "legal central-
 ism" and "legal pluralism" fail to capture the dynamic of the relationship be-
 tween the ROC legal system and Taiwanese society, so the idea of "marginaliza-
 tion of law" is offered as a better description.
 S cholars studying law in developing countries often have
 noted differences between the social foundations for law in those
 countries and the social foundations for law in economically de-
 veloped Western societies. At times these scholars have suggested
 that economic development leads to "modern" legal relations
 and a correspondingly "modern" role for law. At other times,
 scholars have argued that customary and traditional forms of so-
 cial order will persist and limit the effectiveness of regulatory sys-
 tems modeled on Western law. This article examines the role of
 law in one important component of Taiwan's development expe-
 rience-the informal financing techniques used by small busi-
 Funding for the research presented here was provided by the Harvard Club of the
 Republic of China, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Pacific Cultural
 Foundation, and Southern Methodist University. Earlier drafts were presented at the East
 Asian Legal Studies Institute of Harvard Law School; University of Texas School of Law;
 the 1992 Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting; the 1992 Law & Society Associa-
 tion Annual Meeting; a conference on culture and development at Academia Sinica,
 Taipei, Taiwan; a conference on Chinese law at the University of British Columbia; and a
 Workshop on Chinese Capitalism and the Globalization of the Law at the Institute for
 Legal Studies of the University of Wisconsin. An earlier version is being published in
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 (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies). Address correspondence to Jane Kauf-
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 194 Rational Practices and the Marginalization of Law
 nesses-in order to determine the nature of the interaction be-
 tween law and the network structure of traditional Chinese
 society.
 In contrast to the predictions of scholars who have drawn a
 sharp distinction between modern law and customary social or-
 ders in developing (and Western) societies, the evidence pre-
 sented here supports the notion that the relational structure of
 traditional, rural Chinese society has survived in a modified form
 in modern Taiwan and that this modern form blends elements of
 the modern legal system into networks of relationships. The legal
 system of the Republic of China ("ROC") has supported the eco-
 nomic development process not only by directly regulating eco-
 nomic activity but also by indirectly facilitating networks of rela-
 tionships outside the law that also regulate economic activity.
 Further, when small businesses have been unable to rely on the
 formal legal system for such indirect support for relational prac-
 tices, alternatives, including organized crime, have been called
 on to serve a similar function.
 Rather than focusing on better known and successful legal
 initiatives taken by the ROC government such as legislation dat-
 ing back to the early 1960s to stimulate foreign investment in
 Taiwan (Gold 1986:77), this study examines routine and wide-
 spread economic activities in which the impact of modern legal
 institutions is limited or indirect at best: those in the "informal
 sector" or "underground economy." "Informal sector" refers to
 economic activity deliberately transacted outside the purview of
 formal regulation, yet not generally considered criminal.
 Although the informal sector has made a significant contribution
 to Taiwan's rapid economic development over the past 40 years,
 it is as yet poorly understood. To understand informal economic
 practices in Taiwan, I first address the interactions among the
 formal ROC legal system, the networks of personal connections
 which characterize Taiwanese society, and informal substitutes
 for legal regulation (e.g., debt collection with the assistance of
 organized crime). This analysis is next applied to the informal
 financing techniques used by small private firms as just one ex-
 ample of the many types of economic activities routinely under-
 taken in Taiwan's informal sector (for the methodology for my
 research, see appendix 1).
 Studying the practices of small and medium-sized businesses
 is a crucial step in understanding the origins of Taiwan's "eco-
 nomic miracle," because such firms have played a greater role in
 Taiwan's economic development than they have in other East
 Asian newly industrialized countries (Orrui et al. 1991:368). Until
 the mid- to late 1980s, small and medium-sized enterprises in Tai-
 wan relied heavily on financial resources from outside the formal
 financial system because of a shortage of credit from regulated
 sources (Wade 1990:161). While limited access to bank financing
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 clearly contributed to the growth of Taiwan's informal financial
 system, certain features of Taiwanese society also contributed to
 that growth, among them the maintenance of networks of per-
 sonal connections, the availability of informal surrogates for legal
 enforcement, and the marginalization of formal legal institu-
 tions.
 The findings of this study point to an apparent paradox. The
 development of a modern formal legal system may belie the so-
 cial realities in Taiwan, obscuring the propensity of legal institu-
 tions to foster relational practices rather than displace them. The
 very commitment of many legal practitioners and government of-
 ficials to the maintenance of a moder legal system based on for-
 eign models seems to contribute to the marginalization of mod-
 ern formal ROC legal institutions in a manner reminiscent of the
 marginalization of formal legal institutions in the traditional Chi-
 nese polity (Ch'fi 1961). In addition, the formalism of Taiwan's
 transplanted version of the Western legal tradition seems to limit
 the law's flexibility in adapting to contemporary Taiwanese social
 practices, thereby increasing the dependence of businesses on re-
 lational practices outside the law.
 The conclusions drawn from this study raise important ques-
 tions that link the subject matter of this article with larger themes
 in the study of law and development.' First, with regard to gov-
 ernment-sponsored development initiatives, one possible infer-
 ence from this preliminary study is that relational practices play a
 more significant role in development than has previously been
 acknowledged. If that is the case, then social and economic re-
 sources could be mobilized more effectively by officially acknowl-
 edging and even promoting relational practices in the economic
 development process in Taiwan and other Asian nations. Second,
 the idea of a perpetually marginalized legal system subordinated
 to relational practices profoundly conflicts with Western ideas of
 legitimacy based on the rule of law. This suggests that to under-
 stand societies experiencing rapid economic development and
 within which law plays a role very different from the role com-
 1 Although there is evidence that relational practices are endemic in Taiwan
 (Greenhalgh 1988:224), this article cannot catalog or analyze every significant form of
 relational practice in moder Taiwanese society, or even every informal or underground
 financial practice. Thus, while the findings of this preliminary study might support con-
 jectures concerning the significance of relational practices within government, large-scale
 enterprises, or regulated financial institutions, they cannot serve to quantify the degree to
 which informal arrangements supplant formal regulation within those institutions. Fur-
 thermore, since my focus is on the routine financing of small businesses, I do not address
 any of the perhaps better-known recent examples of financial scandals involving large-
 scale credit or investment institutions. These include the Cathay scandal in 1985 (Fields
 1990:194), the more recent problems involving Hung Yuan and other underground in-
 vestment firms (Chen 1992), and the Hualon stock scandal in 1992 (Baum 1992). While
 these well-publicized cases of underground or illicit financial practices raise important
 questions about the effectiveness of the ROC legal system in regulating financial institu-
 tions and the connection between law, organized crime, and relational practices in Tai-
 wan, they are beyond the scope of this article.
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 monly ascribed to it in Western industrialized nations, we must
 reassess such concepts as legitimacy and modernity.
 I. Marginalization of Law in Taiwan
 A. The Paradox of Modem Legality in Taiwan
 While the legal institutions of Taiwan have many modern at-
 tributes, that fact alone does not establish that Taiwan has a
 "modern" legal system. In order to decide whether or not Taiwan
 has a "modern" legal system, two separate issues must be re-
 solved: What constitutes a "modern" legal system? And what are
 the actual characteristics of the contemporary ROC legal system?
 The first issue, determining what constitutes a "modern" legal
 system, is at least as problematic as the second, because of the
 tendency of scholars from societies with "moder" legal systems
 to conflate theoretical or ideological tenets regarding the rule of
 law with the actual social practices that constitute legal institu-
 tions in their own societies. Certain legal scholars have put forth
 the concepts of "legal centralism" and "legal pluralism" (Ga-
 lanter 1981; Griffiths 1986) in an effort both to articulate some
 unstated assumptions that inform most studies of legal systems
 and to bring the analysis of legal systems closer to the actual so-
 cial practices that constitute those systems.
 While "legal centralism" and "legal pluralism" may be useful
 in cutting through some of the obfuscation surrounding the
 study of many legal systems, neither of these concepts captures
 the interaction in Taiwanese society between formal legal institu-
 tions, informal order, and networks of relationships. A satisfac-
 tory account of the role played by the legal system in modern
 Taiwanese society must simultaneously take account of native
 Taiwanese ideas about law and society,2 which have been influ-
 enced by both the modern history of Taiwan and traditional Chi-
 nese values; the values implicit in Western ideas of modern legal-
 ity; and the subtle cultural matrix that determines which ideas
 and values predominate under particular circumstances. While
 the ROC legal system does not play the dominant, central role
 assumed by theories of social organization grounded in the West-
 ern liberal democratic, free-market tradition, neither is Taiwan-
 ese society characterized by a plurality of well-defined, rule-gov-
 erned social organizations that the concept of "legal pluralism"
 postulates as the basic form of social organization. The interac-
 tion of law and society in Taiwan might more accurately be char-
 acterized as the "marginalization of law," a process in which the
 ROC legal system plays a significant role in Taiwanese society but
 2 Paradoxically, many Taiwanese legal professionals subscribe, or at least claim to
 subscribe, to a vision of law based on "legal centralist" ideas.
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 is often displaced by a more fundamental source of social organi-
 zation-fluid, highly contextual networks of human relation-
 ships.
 1. Modern Law and the Presumption of Legal Centralism
 The modern legal system of the ROC was organized in a se-
 ries of steps beginning in the late 1920s.3 Most codes and statutes
 enacted during the Republican period (1911-49) on mainland
 China took German codes and statutes of the late 19th and early
 20th centuries as their models, following the example already set
 by Meiji Japan in modernizing and Westernizing its legal system.
 Effective implementation of the modern ROC legal system was
 severely hindered throughout the Republican period. This was
 due to the limited effectiveness of Republican government on
 the Mainland during the 1930s, followed by the Sino-Japanese
 War from 1937 to 1945 and finally by the Chinese Civil War end-
 ing with the defeat of the KMT ("Kuomintang" [see appendix 2]
 or Nationalist Party) and withdrawal of the ROC government to
 Taiwan in 1949. Since 1949, however, the ROC legal system has
 played an increasingly important role in the economic and social
 life of Taiwan as the number of legal professionals has increased
 and the quality of their training improved and as the quantity
 and sophistication of legal doctrines have grown to meet the
 needs of a rapidly industrializing society.
 Among the most well-known and successful legal initiatives
 taken by the ROC government are the Statute for Encourage-
 ment of Investment and related changes in tax, land use, and
 labor and company laws facilitating direct foreign investment in
 Taiwan and export-oriented growth through the establishment of
 export-processing zones (Hsu 1985:283). These laws were intro-
 duced or amended as part of a broad program of economic re-
 forms in the early 1960s. These reforms laid part of the founda-
 tion for Taiwan's subsequent "economic miracle" and its
 transformation from an underdeveloped agricultural country to
 a highly industrialized country. Today, Taiwan's per capita GNP
 is equivalent to that of some European countries.4
 While the success of these governmental initiatives is well
 known, they are not representative of the general role played by
 the modern ROC legal system in Taiwanese society. Indeed, fo-
 cusing on government led programs that helped nurture Tai-
 wan's successful export-oriented industrialization obscures the
 role more commonly played by the ROC legal system in regulat-
 ing economic activity. Much of Taiwan's industrialization has
 3 The Civil Code was enacted in 1929 and the Criminal Code, the Civil Procedure
 Code, and the Criminal Procedure Code were enacted in 1935. A draft Constitution was
 adopted in 1936 and finally ratified in 1946.
 4 According to the 1993 World Almanac, the 1992 per capita GNP of Taiwan was
 $7,380, which compares favorably with that of Portugal ($5,580) and Greece ($7,650).
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 taken place outside the relatively highly regulated environments
 of the export-processing zones and through domestic rather than
 foreign investment (Haggard & Chen 1987:93). Thus, the visibil-
 ity of such initiatives can easily lead to overestimating the impor-
 tance of state-sponsored regulation and underestimating the im-
 portance of alternative ordering mechanisms.5
 This tendency of some theories of the role of law to empha-
 size the importance of state-sponsored regulation has been la-
 beled "legal centralism" by scholars trying to devise less-biased
 models of the operation of law and legal institutions in society.
 Legal centralism designates not so much a theory as an unarticu-
 lated premise that underlies most contemporary discussions of
 the role of law in society. Legal centralism has variously been de-
 scribed as "a picture in which state agencies (and their learning)
 occupy the center of legal life and stand in a relation of 'hierar-
 chic control' to other, lesser normative orderings such as the
 family, the corporation, the business network" (Galanter
 1981:17); the idea that "law is and should be the law of the state,
 uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and adminis-
 tered by a single set of state institutions" (Griffiths 1986:3); or
 "the dogma that there exists . . . a dominant normative order,
 defined by a general set of rules and principles (the law), ema-
 nating from the state, governing all members of society equally
 and impersonally, and enforced and applied through the ordi-
 nary courts" (Gordon 1985:423).
 The idea of legal centralism has often been criticized as an
 inaccurate characterization of the role of law even in Western
 societies (see, e.g., Ellickson 1991:4; Scott 1992:668; Williamson
 1985:20), and its weakness as a concept has long been recognized
 from a theoretical, jurisprudential perspective (Dworkin 1979:
 62). Nevertheless, the tacit assumption of the normative primacy
 of state-sponsored rule systems has proven remarkably resilient in
 discussions of the role of law in modern societies (Griffiths
 1986). Galanter (1981:20) points out that while empirical studies
 of law in modern societies have repeatedly "discovered" the plu-
 ralistic, non-state-centered nature of the social order, this has lit-
 tle noticeable impact on official accounts of the role of law in
 those societies.
 2. Legal Pluralism, Legal Marginalism, and Chinese Society
 Scholars attempting to avoid the unwarranted assumptions of
 the legal centralist perspective have developed the idea of "legal
 pluralism." Legal pluralism has been defined as "a state of affairs
 5 In a similar vein in his study of labor conditions in small businesses, Shieh
 (1990:14) criticizes the dominance of a "statist" approach in existing studies of Taiwan's
 development, which overemphasizes the role played by governmental initiatives, often
 disregarding the role played by ordinary working people and popular culture.
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 in which behavior pursuant to more than one legal order occurs"
 (Griffiths 1986:2). According to Griffiths, a narrow interpretation
 of legal pluralism would recognize multiple sources of law-like
 regulation within a single society while still assuming the primacy
 of state-centered law. A radical interpretation of legal pluralism,
 however, would deny any hierarchical superiority to state-cen-
 tered law. From this perspective, institutions such as schools, hos-
 pitals, universities, churches, and businesses may promulgate law-
 like norms that merit consideration together with state-spon-
 sored legal norms in understanding the order of a modern soci-
 ety. When such alternatives to legal regulation are taken into ac-
 count, legal pluralism seems to offer a better description of many
 contemporary Western societies than does legal centralism (Ga-
 lanter & Luban 1993:1401).
 However, legal pluralism may not provide an adequate alter-
 native to legal centralism for non-Western societies. This is true
 for Taiwan, where the social order is anchored in networks of
 interpersonal relationships rather than founded on either a cen-
 tral, universal, dominant legal order or a plurality of legalistic
 orders. Fei Xiaotong (1992:61-63), a Chinese sociologist, devised
 two evocative metaphors to contrast the basic social structures of
 Chinese and Western societies. Fei described the organization of
 Western society as comparable to that of a haystack composed of
 bundles of straw, because individuals, like the pieces of hay, form
 discrete organizations with clear boundaries, like the bundles
 that in aggregate compose society. The organization of Chinese
 society, in contrast, is like the concentric ripples that spread out
 when a pebble is thrown into a pond. Each person is at the
 center of a unique network of countless relationships, and while
 every person is embedded in such a network, no two persons
 share the same network.
 While the ideas underlying either legal centralism or legal
 pluralism are consistent with the image of a society composed of
 individuals bundled into defined groups, neither corresponds to
 the fluidity and highly contextual sense of self and social organi-
 zation implied in the image of the ripples in a pond. While the
 role played by legal institutions in constituting the social order is
 clear in the image of society as bundles of hay, it is not clear what
 role formally constituted institutions, such as legal institutions,
 play in a society made up of networks of relationships.
 While neither legal centralism nor legal pluralism captures
 the nature of legal regulation within the Chinese tradition, the
 absence of a native Chinese tradition of legal analysis (Jones
 1974:331) means that there are few indigenous jurisprudential
 theories that can be drawn upon in developing an alternative
 model of law and development in modern Taiwanese society.6
 6 The assertion is not that there is no recognition of the importance of law in indig-
 enous Chinese philosophy or social theory, but that there is no native tradition of the sort
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 One attempt to capture the salient elements of the role of law in
 traditional Chinese society is expressed by the idea of the "Con-
 fucianization of law" (Ch'ii 1961:267). This refers to the develop-
 ment and maintenance of a formal legal system not as the core of
 a universal, state-centered normative order but rather as a device
 to reinforce and stabilize networks of human relationships. Ac-
 cording to Confucian precepts, these relationships constitute the
 basis of a virtuous and harmonious society. In the traditional Chi-
 nese polity, the administration of law (fa) was understood to be
 punitive, coercive, and morally debased in comparison with the
 uplifting spiritual influence of ritual practices and human rela-
 tionships (li) (Bodde & Morris 1971:13).
 Although Confucian teachings may have limited vitality in
 modern Taiwanese society, participation in relationships remains
 the primary factor both in determining the sense of self and in
 constituting the social order in the contemporary Taiwanese
 world view and social psychology (Bond & Hwang 1986:221). So-
 cial organizations and institutions with well-defined structures,
 such as the formal legal system, are relegated to a subordinate
 position in human affairs. The idea of subordinating law to net-
 works of relationships diverges radically from models of society
 based on either legal centralism or legal pluralism. An expres-
 sion such as the "marginalization of law" or "legal marginalism"
 may better express the role played by legal institutions in a
 predominantly relational society while also avoiding any sugges-
 tion that law furnishes a universal, uniform, or dominant social
 ordering mechanism.
 Legal institutions in Taiwan are marginalized not only by the
 propensity of members of society to seek their objectives through
 networks of relationships but also by a distinctive sense of what
 legal institutions can and should accomplish. One of the funda-
 mental premises of the "legal centralist" idea of modern law is
 that law, together with individual expressions of free will within
 the framework of a social order demarcated by law, should con-
 stitute the normative structure of liberal society. The traditional
 Chinese sense of the relationship between law (fa) and the social
 order is very different. In terms of Confucian ideology, ii (often
 translated as "ritual" or "propriety") is regarded as the morally
 superior wellspring of social order, while positive law is merely a
 tool of the state, to be invoked as necessary to censure antisocial
 behavior.
 It would be simplistic and inaccurate to assume that these
 Confucian ideas operate in modern Taiwanese society in the
 of doctrinal exegesis associated with jurisprudence in the Western European tradition
 (ones 1974:332-34). The Chinese "Legalist" School of political philosophy emphasized
 the role of coercive techniques of social control in strengthening the authority of a cen-
 tral administration rather than the interpretation of legal rules (Bodde & Morris 1971:
 18).
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 same form they once had in traditional Chinese society. How-
 ever, some semblance of these ideas is still visible under the ve-
 neer of modem legality in Taiwan, like a pentimento reappear-
 ing through the image that has been painted over it. Many
 Taiwanese people interviewed for this study, including legal pro-
 fessionals steeped in modern Western traditions of legality, rou-
 tinely presumed that the invocation of law involved suppression
 and punishment and often dismissed the idea that law could em-
 power participants in realizing their objectives. The unstated as-
 sumption that law is best suited to reprimand misconduct and
 that nonlegal forms of social intercourse were better suited to
 enabling or facilitating voluntary interactions often underlay the
 distinctive manner in which local participants interpreted laws
 and decided whether to avail themselves of legal institutions in
 Taiwan.
 B. Marginalization of State-centered Regulation
 In Taiwan, the manner in which the formal modern legal sys-
 tem is administered often facilitates, directly or indirectly, rela-
 tional practices. Factors contributing to the marginalization of
 ROC legal institutions include the legacy of martial law and one-
 party rule; ambivalence among personnel charged with enforc-
 ing the law about the values of modern legality; a tendency to-
 ward rigid formalism in drafting legislation that both divorces
 law from social realities and obscures the exercise of official dis-
 cretion; the relatively limited number of trained legal profession-
 als; and the allegedly common practice by some government offi-
 cials of ignoring violations of the law when they choose to do so.
 Some of the most dramatic and obvious restraints on the
 ROC legal system resulted from the imposition of martial law
 (1937-87) and the Emergency Measures of 1948, suspending or
 modifying parts of the 1946 Constitution. The Emergency Meas-
 ures enhanced the power of the executive branch of government
 during the period of the "communist insurgency on the Main-
 land," while martial law provided that many offenses against the
 government or public order would be tried in courts-martial, not
 in civilian courts. The policies of the Nationalist Party (also
 known as the Kuomintang or KMT) also undermined the integ-
 rity of the ROC legal system through an authoritarian, "quasi-
 Leninist" system of political control (Cheng 1989). Before the
 repeal of martial law and liberalization of the KMT regime, the
 autonomy of the ROC legal system was in many respects effec-
 tively subordinated to the interests of KMT party apparatus and
 the executive branch of the ROC government.
 One reason the KMT kept such a tight grip on the political
 system of Taiwan was the latent ethnic tension between Main-
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 landers and Taiwanese.7 Until the late 1980s, one of the most
 notable features of the political landscape in Taiwan was the con-
 tinued dominance of a ruling elite drawn primarily from refu-
 gees who came to Taiwan from mainland China in the late 1940s
 and the corresponding suppression of many of the civil liberties
 of the Taiwanese people. The tension between the Taiwanese
 and the Mainlanders became acute in 1947 when an uprising by
 local people against corrupt KMT rule in Taiwan was violently
 suppressed. Although this ethnic tension was not officially ac-
 knowledged until recent years, it has remained a significant fac-
 tor in Taiwanese politics and society ever since (Tien 1989:36).
 Policies, official or unofficial, of a central government cannot
 be the exclusive determinant of an institution as large and com-
 plex as a national legal system, so elements of local legal culture
 and the attitudes of individual practitioners must also be taken
 into account. Many government staff members charged with en-
 forcing the law in Taiwan seem to have ambivalent feelings about
 the values of modern legality. During interviews, legal profession-
 als tended to emphasize the observance of formal, modern legal
 values in Taiwan and to obscure the role played by the legal sys-
 tem in maintaining relational practices and the informal sector.
 The invocation of modern legal values in Taiwan, however, often
 seems to mask a much more traditionally Chinese sense that the
 power of law should be invoked not to constitute the social order
 but to reinforce a social order primarily constituted by relation-
 ships. The speakers seemed to be invoking the ideals of a mod-
 ern legal system while downplaying the social realities of modern
 Taiwanese society in order to avoid acknowledging the conflict
 between Chinese values and Western legal values.
 One way in which this kind of ambivalence among legal pro-
 fessionals toward the values of modern legality is indirectly ex-
 pressed is in the predilection for highly formalistic laws that are
 often significantly divorced from social realities. A high degree of
 formalism in drafting legislation maintains the distance between
 legal institutions and other social activities, encouraging recourse
 to alternative ordering mechanisms such as networks of relation-
 ships or simply relegating the law to irrelevance. In addition,
 rigid formalism subordinates legal institutions to political imper-
 atives by disguising the exercise of official discretion. By enacting
 formal laws that are not always consistent with social realities,
 ROC legislators tacitly sanction the exercise of considerable dis-
 cretion in their application.
 Even the most ardent proponents of modernization of the
 ROC legal system acknowledge that the existing corpus of ROC
 7 Today, roughly 70% of Taiwan's 20 million people are "Taiwanese" (descendants
 of immigrants from Fukien province in the 18th and 19th centuries), 12-15% Hakka, and
 1-2% aboriginal; the remaining 12-15% are "Mainlanders" (post-1949 refugees from
 Mainland China or their Taiwan-born descendants) (Tien 1989:36).
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 law is labyrinthine, replete with "ironies and inconsistencies,"
 although they would prescribe larger doses of modernization
 and liberalization as a cure for the problem (Liu 1990:214).
 Unofficially, ROC authorities often tolerate gross and notorious
 violations of the law for extended periods of time, as was the case
 with underground investment companies. From 1982 until the
 collapse of most of these firms in 1989, Taiwanese people in-
 vested the equivalent of U.S.$8.5 billion in underground invest-
 ment companies, most of which were little more than Ponzi
 schemes (Chen 1992:127). In addition, ROC authorities have
 been known to selectively enforce highly restrictive regulations in
 order to achieve unofficial, unstated objectives such as the har-
 assment of political dissidents (Arrigo 1994).
 The extent of official discretion in Taiwan is not overt, and it
 differs from both Japanese and American models. The use of for-
 malism to mask official discretion in Taiwan contrasts with the
 Japanese practices of "legal informality" or "bureaucratic infor-
 mality" in which modern legal institutions have been adapted to
 permit the overt exercise of discretion by government officials.
 In Japan, open-textured drafting of legislation is used to make
 express grants of discretion to decisionmakers. In addition, insti-
 tutional mediation is widely used to harmonize Japanese legal
 standards and social conditions (Upham 1987:17). Nor have
 ROC legislators adopted the common U.S. practice of granting a
 degree of discretion to decisionmakers through the use of flexi-
 ble standards and balancing tests in drafting legislation (Llewel-
 lyn 1953:782).
 Another significant factor limiting the autonomy of the legal
 system from political and relational influences is the relatively
 small number of legal professionals in Taiwan and the large
 numbers of "back doors" to the legal profession. This is impor-
 tant because the number of practicing lawyers in Taiwan has his-
 torically been very restricted. In 1991, the ROC Ministry of Jus-
 tice estimated that there were only 2,254 members of the private
 bar.8 Until very recently, the tiny number of successful candi-
 dates passing the regular bar exam9 was never adequate to meet
 even the limited demand for lawyers recognized by the ROC au-
 thorities. Before the recent relaxation in standards applied to
 8 The data on numbers of legal professionals and admissions to the bar were pro-
 vided by the Ministry of Justice in correspondence in August 1992. Given Taiwan's 1990
 population of 20,454,000, this represents a ratio of about 1 lawyer per 9,000 persons,
 which is equivalent to the Japanese ratio of 1/9,400 persons but much lower than the
 ratios of other civil code countries such as France, with 1/2,000 or the former West Ger-
 many with 1/500. Galanter 1992:82; Ocasal 1992:14.
 9 For 1950-91, of 37,308 persons sitting the bar exam, 1,723 (4.62%) candidates
 passed the exam. In any one year, the total number of successful candidates might be as
 low 16 of 2,142 (0.75%), the result in 1988. Starting in 1989, however, the bar exam pass
 rate dramatically increased, producing a rapid expansion in the number of licensed law-
 yers in Taiwan. In 1991, an unprecedented 363 of 3,977 (11.14%) passed, the highest
 number ever to qualify.
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 candidates sitting the bar exam, the number of lawyers in Taiwan
 was supplemented by admissions to the bar under other criteria.
 These "back doors" to admission are often open to lawyers who
 pass no formal qualifying examination, or pass a less rigorous
 qualifying exam, but who have been screened according to infor-
 mal, often political, criteria.10 Informants estimated that until re-
 cent years, two-thirds of all lawyers in Taiwan had come through
 various back doors, relying at least in part on patronage connec-
 tions not only for admission to the bar but trading on those per-
 sonal and political connections after admission to the bar for
 their effectiveness in representing clients. Thus for many years,
 even among the small number of lawyers admitted to private
 practice, only a minority achieved their position or ply their
 trade by relying exclusively on their formal legal training.
 The common allegations of corruption among legal person-
 nel and lax enforcement of existing regulations are evidence that
 legal institutions are at least perceived as subordinated to inter-
 personal networks in Taiwanese society. Allegations of corrup-
 tion amongjudges and prosecutors in Taiwan are widespread but
 difficult to verify. One magistrate (himself relatively young and
 having qualified by formal exam) acknowledged thatjudges' rep-
 utation for taking bribes was not without some foundation. He
 felt that judges who had gotten their positions through various
 back doors were more likely to permit their judgments to be in-
 fluenced by entreaties from colleagues, while younger magis-
 trates who qualified through formal exams were more likely to
 resist such appeals to personal connections.
 With regard to the potential abuse of prosecutorial discre-
 tion, informants offered anecdotal evidence to support similar
 conclusions. Discussions with government officials charged with
 enforcing business registration and licensing laws indicated that
 while the official posture was one of rigorous and uniform en-
 forcement of the law, in fact, given the magnitude of noncompli-
 ance, the official practice in most instances was one of tolerance.
 Official investigations and prosecutions were only commenced in
 response to complaints, and in the absence of any complaints,
 any enforcement action was unlikely against even quite obvious
 violations.
 10 From 1981 to 1991, a total of 857 candidates were admitted to the bar without
 any qualifying exam because of their status as magistrate, prosecutor, law professor, doc-
 tor of laws, senior judicial administrator, military judge, or military prosecutor. While
 access to positions such as magistrate or militaryjudge may in turn be based on competi-
 tive examinations, the pass rates for those exams have historically been higher than the
 pass rates for the regular bar exam. For example, for 1981-91, pass rates for the magis-
 trate/prosecutor exam ranged from 5% to 10%; pass rates for the militaryjudges exam
 had pass rates from 40% to 78%. (The total number of candidates for the magistrates/
 prosecutors exam is equivalent to the number of candidates for the regular bar exam, but
 only a small handful of candidates sit for the biannual military judges exam.) The scope
 for political screening of candidates for admission to the bar is highest with lawyers com-
 ing from military service, legal academia, and government service.
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 The administration of law in Taiwan is thus a highly complex
 and nuanced process, reflecting the limitations imposed on legal
 institutions by the structure of legislation, political constraints,
 cultural predispositions, and other variables. While the ROC
 legal system may function with a high degree of efficacy in some
 contexts, that degree of effectiveness is clearly not uniform. The
 restrictions on the effectiveness of the ROC legal system are so
 substantial, however, that the ROC legal system cannot be said to
 stand in the relation of hierarchic control over other normative
 systems in Taiwanese society that conformity with the ideal of
 legal centralism would require. Given the diminished scope of
 state-centered law in Taiwanese society, a theory of the role of
 law and development in Taiwan must identify alternative sources
 of normative ordering outside the state and then determine what
 factors account for the displacement of formal law in some situa-
 tions and not others. The primary alternatives in Taiwanese soci-
 ety seem to be networks of relationships and informal surrogates
 for the legal system.
 C. Relational Practices and Other Alternatives to Legal Regulation
 While traditional Chinese society was characterized by dense
 networks of relationships with relatively little role for formal legal
 institutions (Fei 1992), modern Taiwanese society cannot simply
 be equated with traditional Chinese society. The last four de-
 cades of rapid industrialization have had a profound impact on
 Taiwan's social fabric (Tien 1989:31). Thus it would hardly be
 surprising to find that while the relational structure of Chinese
 society has survived in some form in modern Taiwan, that struc-
 ture was modified by the social conditions of a rapidly industrial-
 izing, increasingly urban society heavily involved in international
 trade and commerce.
 The evidence gathered for this study of the role of law in
 Taiwan's development suggests that many elements of the mod-
 ern ROC legal system have been drawn into relational structures
 to compensate for the loss of more traditional techniques of
 maintaining relationships. Where formal legal mechanisms were
 inadequate, informal alternatives to legal regulation, such as
 those provided by organized crime, are sometimes relied on as
 substitute mechanisms to police cooperation and punish viola-
 tions of relational or other norms.
 1. Personal Relationships and Network Building
 In both Western and Chinese economies, many exchanges of
 goods and services take place within relationships rather than as
 discrete transactions between strangers in an anonymous com-
 petitive market. American legal theorists devised the concept of
 "relational contract" (Macaulay 1963; Macneil 1978) to adapt
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 modern contract law to actual business practices. Relational con-
 tracts, which consist of flexible, long-term relationships, can be
 contrasted with either discrete contracts, in which no relation ex-
 ists between the parties apart from the simple exchange of goods,
 or corporations, which consist of complex hierarchical structures
 that facilitate cooperation (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985).
 While the networks of relationships characteristic of a Chi-
 nese society have many points in common with the relational
 contracts identified in American society by Macaulay, Macneil,
 and Williamson, there remain significant differences. These dif-
 ferences seem to be ultimately grounded in a different sense of
 how the self is constituted in relation to other members of society
 and in relation to social norms external to any personal relation-
 ship. The Western concept of "contract" in its most general form
 is based on the presumption of an individualistic, "boundaried"
 sense of self manifested through exercise of free will with refer-
 ence to transcendent norms.'1 The contrasting Chinese idea of
 relationship presupposes a more contextualized sense of self,
 where the self is actually constituted by relationships and family
 relationships are the most important (Bond & Hwang 1986:220).
 In order to convey a sense of these differences, the label "rela-
 tional practices" is used in this article to distinguish Taiwanese
 relational business practices from the American relational con-
 tracts.
 The family is the basic social unit in Chinese society, and the
 interdependence and cooperation of family members is based on
 a pragmatic assessment of the benefits that accrue through col-
 lective action with family members. Unlike the Western concept
 of family, the Chinese idea of family has no clear boundaries but
 is highly flexible and can expand to include more than those
 bound by blood or marriage (Fei 1992:61). Building connec-
 tions, or guanxi, with individuals not bound by family relation-
 ships proceeds on the basis of analogies to family relationships
 and can counteract, although not entirely overcome, the anxiety
 associated with dealing with nonfamily members (Hwang 1987:
 952). In the absence of self-consciously forged relationships, the
 Chinese presumption is that there are no preexisting duties
 owed between strangers, and dealing with strangers is therefore
 highly problematic and fraught with potential dangers (Redding
 1990:66).
 A calculated process of either building connections with
 promising outsiders or refusing to make connections with less
 desirable favor seekers, together with the maintenance of family
 connections, forms much of the institutional framework within
 which business transactions in Taiwan take place (Orrui et al.
 1 This sketch of the Western sense of self is of course little more than a caricature
 that has been often criticized as inaccurate even when applied to the United States (e.g.,
 West 1988).
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 1991). The process of building or dismantling relationships in
 Taiwan consists in doing (or not doing) "favors" (renqing) for
 others and allowing everyone to maintain a sense of "face" (mi-
 anzi). Within Chinese social relations, it is essential to have
 "face"-to impress others as being a successful, responsible per-
 son so that one may have access to the resources that others con-
 trol and allocate through favors (Hwang 1987).
 In trying to obtain access to scarce resources, a person will
 first seek assistance from someone with whom he or she has
 either a family connection or a particularistic tie, such as a school
 classmate, a neighbor, a work colleague, or a former teacher or
 student. That relative or friend will feel some pressure not to
 cause the favor seeker to lose face by denying the favor, as well as
 not to lose face himself or herself by appearing to be someone
 without sufficient connections to resolve the problem. The per-
 son making the decision either to help or to evade the request
 for help will take into account the petitioner's quality of connec-
 tions and personal integrity in order to estimate the likelihood
 that the petitioner could return the favor at some undetermined
 future date.
 When Chinese society was still predominantly rural, proce-
 dures for establishing and maintaining relationships through
 kinship networks were fairly stable and readily comprehensible to
 all members of society. Thus, many commercial transactions
 could take place within relationships as a mutual gift exchange
 rather than as a free-market transaction (Fei 1992:101, 126). In
 contemporary Taiwan, however, many entrepreneurs have been
 forced to go outside their local communities to conduct their
 business. In addition to greater exposure to other Taiwanese
 businesses from outside their immediate community, many en-
 trepreneurs have entered into sustained contact with foreign in-
 stitutions, often on the basis of formal legal arrangements. In
 contemporary Taiwanese society, relational practices alone may
 not provide the security necessary for economic transactions to
 take place between people without kinship ties.
 The problem of "bad faith business failure" (exin daobi) illus-
 trates the type of risks faced by business owners when doing busi-
 ness outside a well-established relationship. According to many
 informants, business failures are common in Taiwan because
 businesses are small and undercapitalized and rely heavily on
 short-term contracts from overseas buyers. The customary infor-
 mal solution to the problem of business insolvency is for col-
 leagues to accept 30% of the full amount owed, producing an
 informal composition (i.e., voluntary dicharge granted by credi-
 tors) after a business fails. According to a magistrate, the 30%
 figure became customary among business people because under
 sentencing guidelines applied when dishonoring a check was a
 criminal offense, the sentence imposed included a fine equal to
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 30% of the amount of the check together with a jail sentence.
 Since the principal of the business would have to pay at least 30%
 of any debt evidenced by a check if the creditors turned the mat-
 ter over for prosecution, it became customary to simply offer the
 30% to the creditors in exchange for not instituting a criminal
 prosecution.
 Not all business failures are a function of bad luck or errors
 in judgment, however, and some business people seemed to be
 exploiting creditors' willingness to accept 30% in settlement of
 the debts of a failed business. This gave rise to the proverbial
 "10-7-3-4" scheme used in connection with exin daobi: a product
 purchased for $10 could readily be sold for $7 and, after the
 principal offered creditors the customary $3 to settle the debts of
 the business, the purchaser would pocket a profit of $4. Several
 informants who were actually in business acknowledged being fa-
 miliar with the "10-7-3-4" concept, indicating that even if the
 practice is not widespread, concern over the possibility of such
 fraudulent schemes may be.
 Given the insecurity caused by the potential for fraud in deal-
 ings with relative strangers, parties to business transactions that
 are conducted outside the immediate family circle may take the
 precaution of reinforcing the security of the relationship by ap-
 propriating elements of legal or other regulatory mechanisms.
 This procedure of using legal institutions to reinforce what are
 ultimately nonlegal relationships is well known even in studies of
 law and society focused on American society. Relational contract
 theory presumes that the parties incorporate elements of the for-
 mal legal system into the structure of their relationship because
 relational contracts are just one element of the subject matter of
 contract law generally (Macneil 1978). For example, taking a se-
 curity interest in personal property may be thought of as laying
 the foundation for flexible cooperation within a long-term rela-
 tionship rather than simply providing a contractual mechanism
 for improving a creditor's chances of recovery after default
 (Scott 1986:903). Courts can be thought of as conferring "bar-
 gaining endowments" on the parties to a conflict rather than
 merely adjudicating disputes through the application of rules
 (Galanter 1981:6). Discounting postdated checks, discussed in
 detail below, is a prime example of using selected elements of
 the ROC legal system to reinforce relationship structures that be-
 came increasingly less personalistic as Taiwan developed eco-
 nomically.
 2. Organized Crime as a Surrogate for Law
 If the ROC legal system is unable fully to provide the neces-
 sary backstop for a relationship in modern Taiwan, the parties
 have the option of turning to substitutes. Organized crime plays
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 a significant role in policing transactions in the informal sector
 in Taiwan. While the term liumang is used in ordinary conversa-
 tion to denote either a hooligan/delinquent or a member of an
 organized gang, the discussion that follows focuses on the activi-
 ties of the latter, more formally known as bangliufenzi.
 Gang members may own and operate businesses themselves,
 they may demand protection money from other businesses, or
 they may provide various services to other businesses. Operating
 barbershops (i.e., massage parlors/brothels) or nightclubs, gam-
 bling, moneylending, and smuggling are among the illicit activi-
 ties organized gangs undertake in Taiwan, although in recent
 years they have become more active in otherwise legitimate busi-
 nesses such as real estate development and stock brokerages
 (Sheu 1990).
 Gangs also derive substantial revenues by demanding protec-
 tion money from legitimate businesses such as restaurants and
 other retail establishments. Informants described the following
 process: a man (presumed to be associated with the organized
 gang with jurisdiction over the location of the store) offers for
 sale a container of cheap tea for 10 or 20 times its fair value. The
 merchant or restauranteur then pays the sum demanded rather
 than risk a disruption of business.
 According to informants who claimed to have first-hand ex-
 perience dealing with gang members in commercial contexts,
 gangsters also offer such services as providing bodyguards, offer-
 ing to represent interested parties in negotiations, collecting
 debts, or other dispute resolution services. Members of organ-
 ized gangs perceive themselves as providing valuable services and
 operating a business with a view to its long-term growth and con-
 tinued operations, and thus avoid unnecessary violence in the
 discharge of their duties (Sheu 1990). They sometimes even have
 business cards printed showing themselves as officers of enter-
 prises offering, for example, dispute resolution and debt collec-
 tion services.
 While recourse to gang members was mentioned repeatedly
 by informants as one element of doing business in the under-
 ground economy in Taiwan, very few informants would admit to
 having personally dealt with gang members, making it difficult to
 know if the practice is really as widespread as informants seemed
 to think it is. For example, in response to "How can you tell you
 are dealing with a gangster rather than an ordinary business per-
 son?" one businessman who claimed to have dealt with gangsters
 stated that they can be identified from among a group of busi-
 nessmen because although they have no apparent qualifications
 or ability, they act in an arrogant and overbearing manner. An-
 other businessman stated that gang members can be identified
 because they stand to the side of negotiations with their hands in
 their pockets, suggesting they are carrying guns. Short of overt
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 acts of violence, the criteria informants used for distinguishing
 gang members from legitimate businessmen is apparently fairly
 vague and situation-specific.
 Informants variously reported that gangsters work for flat
 fees payable in advance and on a contingency fee basis, sug-
 gesting that gangsters may negotiate different forms of compen-
 sation for different matters. There was a striking consistency,
 however, in the descriptions of how a party learns that the other
 side of a commercial dispute has hired gang members to assist in
 resolving the dispute. The gang members might be hired, for ex-
 ample, to settle a dispute about whether allegedly nonconform-
 ing goods should be paid for in full, or whether work under a
 lucrative contract should be subcontracted to a particular party.
 The party being threatened arrives at work to find several strange
 men sitting around, perhaps in the reception area. The men say
 nothing, sitting patiently all day or playing cards to pass the time.
 The threatened party can infer from this that the other party to
 the dispute has hired gang members and that if the dispute is not
 brought to a speedy resolution, the level of intimidation will soon
 increase. Increased sanctions include threats to kidnap family
 members or of bodily harm to the threatened person.
 Gangsters can also be more effective than courts in collecting
 debts acknowledged to be due. Courts are often perceived as un-
 helpful to litigants because, in the words of several informants,
 the standard of proof is "too high," although this may just be
 another way of saying the court expects formal documentation of
 transactions that most parties cannot provide. Assuming a party
 can obtain a favorable judgment, he or she may still not be able
 to locate any assets to attach. Debtors' assets in Taiwan are diffi-
 cult to locate because of a lack of public access to records of own-
 ership of company assets, unreliable accounting practices, and
 the ease and regularity with which assets can be transferred or
 held in the name of family members. Thus the relational system
 of relying on family and friends and not on formal, public rec-
 ordkeeping can frustrate legitimate attempts at debt collection.
 By hiring gang members to collect debts, however, the relational
 system that obscures the location of assets from formal collection
 attempts is mobilized in reverse to generate assets. If a debtor or
 a debtor's family members are threatened with physical harm,
 then the debtor will mobilize assets by calling on relational ties to
 pay the obligation, thus permitting a creditor to recover in excess
 of the debtor's personal assets.12
 12 One local attorney, who recognized that gang members were effectively in com-
 petition with lawyers in some arenas, recounted a tale of woe that had befallen a client
 forced to deal with gang members. The client had sold on a commission basis investments
 in limited partnerships in U.S. real estate that later became worthless. A few investors
 demanded that the client repay their investments in full and refused to accept that the
 client, acting as agent for a now-defunct principal, could not return their money. The
 frustrated investors apparently hired gangsters to put pressure on the salesman. The
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 II. Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in
 Taiwan
 Before I describe certain common informal financial prac-
 tices, I must clarify the concept of the informal sector and how it
 applies to Taiwan's economy. The term "informal sector" was
 coined 20 years ago by a researcher studying levels of employ-
 ment in developing countries in order to discuss what all those
 purportedly unemployed people were actually doing (Hart
 1973). Castells and Portes (1989:12) defined the informal sector
 as "unregulated activity in a legal and social environment where
 similar activities are regulated," and distinguished informal (or
 underground) economic activity from both criminal activity and
 regulated economic activity. Thus, by definition, underground or
 informal economic activity directly implicates the role of the
 legal system in society.13 According to a study reported in 1990,
 the informal sector accounted for about 57% of all economic ac-
 tivity in Taiwan (Chai 1990).14 For developed countries such as
 the United States, estimates of informal economic activity range
 from 3.4% to 21.7% of all economic activity (Tanzi 1982:88).
 While many activities in Taiwan take place outside the scope
 of formal legal regulation, however, it may not be particularly
 useful to lump them all together under the rubric "informal" or
 "underground." In this article, "informal" will denote activities
 that should be registered or licensed by the authorities but are
 not, or that give rise to a tax liability but no taxes are paid. Busi-
 ness enterprises in Taiwan are required to register with the ap-
 propriate administrative agency in order to receive permission to
 engage in economic activities (ROC Business Registration Law,
 art. 3). Small-scale businesses apply to local or municipal authori-
 ties, while larger businesses apply to the Ministry of Economic
 Affairs. The dividing line is whether a business has paid-in capital
 of over New Taiwan ("N.T.") $40 million and assets of over N.T.
 $120 million.15 According to official statistics compiled in 1989,
 gangsters appeared at his workplace, telephoned his home and threatened his family
 members and finally kidnapped him, releasing him only after he wrote checks for the full
 amount the investors had lost. The salesman was only able to cover the checks by borrow-
 ing money from friends and relatives.
 13 Several problems arise from the attempt to define the informal sector exclusively
 by its relationship to formal regulation. One is that it is not clear how "informal" can be
 so neatly demarcated from what is "criminal" in any society, because many activities of the
 informal sector are actually criminal according to statute or administrative regulations.
 The definition of the "informal sector" as economic activity taking place outside the reach
 of formal regulation presupposes formal regulation as the norm and is thus another ex-
 ample of the pervasiveness of the idea of legal centralism in theories of the relationship
 between law and development.
 14 Chai estimated the informal sector in Taiwan made up 16% of economic activity
 in 1962, 32% in 1982, and 40% in 1986.
 15 This standard applies to manufacturing businesses; similar standards exist for ex-
 tractive, trading and service businesses. Rules Governing Small & Medium Enterprise
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 98% of all registered businesses in Taiwan are small and only 2%
 are large, whereas 60% of GNP is contributed by small businesses
 and 40% by large (ROC SMMB 1989). A business may engage
 only in those activities for which it has applied and been granted
 permission by the relevant authority-blanket authorizations to
 engage in "any lawful business" are not granted. Informal activi-
 ties in Taiwan are conducted not only by companies that fail to
 register but also by companies that exceed the scope of activities
 authorized by their business registration.
 Business enterprises are also required to register with tax au-
 thorities. Local tax authorities collect the business tax-a value-
 added tax ("VAT") introduced in 1986-and the land value in-
 crement tax,'6 while central authorities collect the income tax
 levied on profit-seeking enterprises. Informal activities are car-
 ried on by businesses that fail to pay any tax, as well as those that
 pay some tax but take deliberate steps to understate the level of
 taxable activities they have undertaken.
 Until recent years, ROC authorities concentrated on generat-
 ing tax revenues through duties levied on foreign trade and
 adopted a fairly relaxed attitude toward collecting domestically
 oriented taxes such as the income tax. This was one component
 of a general policy of noninterference with small-scale economic
 development that led not only to widespread tax evasion among
 small businesses but also to pollution problems, chaotic land use,
 and unregulated labor conditions (Wade 1990:175, 268-70). In
 recent years, however, ROC tax authorities have made major ef-
 forts to increase the incidence of tax payments by businesses by
 reducing corruption and opportunities for evasion. If successful,
 these efforts will diminish the magnitude of tax evasion and sub-
 ject many business practices to sustained government scrutiny,
 undermining the ability of participants to use networks of con-
 nections to evade regulation. The most prominent initiative was
 the replacement of the old business receipts tax with a VAT in
 1986.17
 Assistance, arts. 4 & 5 (last revised 14 July 1982). In 1990 when this information was
 obtained, the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar and N.T. dollar was about 1:26.
 16 The land value increment tax was introduced by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the
 ROC, and was based on the 19th-century "single tax" movement in the United States. See
 George 1879.
 17 The old tax could easily be evaded by using forged receipts instead of the num-
 bered receipts provided by the government. The new tax is levied only on the incremen-
 tal value added by an enterprise, and taxpayers are required to produce receipts for both
 purchases and sales to establish what that increment is. Failure to produce sales receipts
 will tend to reduce tax liability, but failure to produce purchase receipts will tend to
 overstate tax liability, thus creating an incentive for buyers to demand receipts from sell-
 ers and creating a paper trail government officials can retrace. To induce retail customers
 to demand receipts, the government holds a lottery in which the winning number is one
 of those printed on uniform VAT receipts. Large taxpayers provide VAT information in
 computer-readable formats, and the local tax authorities have created substantial
 databases on firm revenues and expenses that permit them to cross-check taxpayer re-
 ported information for reliability.
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 While the new VAT system is unquestionably more effective
 than the system it replaced, allegations of widespread tax evasion
 persist among people in business. Techniques for evading VAT
 include systematic underreporting of both expenses and sales so
 that some income is reported and some tax paid but the payment
 is only a fraction of what is due. This strategy of partial payment
 and partial disclosure is reported to be practiced with regard to
 many types of tax. These strategies of systematic underreporting
 require multiple participants to be successful, and without a high
 degree of trust between participants they would be too risky to
 undertake. The need for discretion in accounting services in par-
 ticular has apparently given rise to a profession of "under-
 ground" accountants who prepare both "outside" or official
 books for public consumption, and "inside" or accurate books
 for the owner's use alone (Wuo 1987).18
 Small businesses in Taiwan typically have relied more heavily
 on debt finance than on equity capital and have been forced to
 look to the informal financial sector to provide that debt finance
 (Wade 1990:160-61). Until the significant liberalization of bank-
 ing in Taiwan beginning in the late 1980s (Winn 1991), commer-
 cial banks and other regulated financial institutions in Taiwan
 catered primarily to the needs of large and medium-sized busi-
 nesses, leaving small businesses to secure financing through
 whatever channels they could. This bifurcation in credit alloca-
 tion was due to a variety of factors: until the mid-1980s, there was
 a chronic shortage of credit generally in Taiwan; small businesses
 did not usually maintain the kind of accounting records that
 commercial lenders required; and commercial banks allocated
 18 Tax collection agencies are aware of the problem of multiple account books.
 Account books that have been shown to the tax authorities are marked with red seals to
 force the taxpayer to consistently show the authorities the same set of books with each
 audit. Taxpayers who can establish to the tax collection authorities' satisfaction that their
 tax returns are based on a legitimate accounting system are permitted certain tax conces-
 sions. Income Tax Law, art. 77, provides for "blue" returns, prepared by a public account-
 ant, making the taxpayer eligible for entertainment expense deductions and a three-year
 loss carryforward. Income Tax Law, arts. 37.1 & 39. Taxpayers with businesses over a cer-
 tain size are required to have their accounts certified by a public accountant, and in
 recent years the standards for certification have been tightened up. Businesses with no
 reliable accounting records have their tax liability estimated by the tax authorities based
 on information on gross sales revenue. The estimates are made based on a complex ma-
 trix of average profitability rates for hundreds of different industries. Income Tax Law,
 art. 80. Penalties can be assessed if too many records are missing. Income Tax Law, art.
 105.
 The tax authorities are also well aware of the pressure on government employees to
 be drawn into personal relationships at the expense of their official responsibilities. Tax
 auditors are now required to meet with taxpayers only in open-plan government offices
 where co-workers are able to witness and overhear any exchanges between the auditor
 and the taxpayer, and on-site audits are now the exception. While this may have reduced
 the pressure on auditors to bend the rules, it also removes any opportunity the auditor
 may have had to compare the reported size of the taxpayer's business operation with the
 actual physical plant and equipment used in the business. Furthermore, one banker re-
 ported that the practice among businesses is now to learn the auditor's name in advance
 and invite that person for a meal prior to the audit.
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 credit to large and medium-sized businesses in accordance with
 policies established by the government, which not only regulated
 the banks but also owned them.
 Some of the financing of small businesses is provided by fam-
 ily and friends in the form of capital contributions not rigorously
 styled as either equity or debt. Other financing is acquired
 through the use of rotating credit lotteries, known as biaohui; dis-
 counting postdated checks; borrowing from underground mon-
 eylenders who usually operate with at least the protection of or-
 ganized gangs; and real estate loans arranged by scriveners,
 known as daishu. The following discussion focuses on the
 nonfamilial, nonregulated financing mechanisms.
 Biaohui, Mutual Savings & Loan Societies, and Small & Medium
 Business Banks
 1. The Structure of Biaohui
 Rotating credit associations, known as biaohui in Chinese,
 have been found in cultures and regions as diverse as sub-
 Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Korea, and the West Indies
 (Geertz 1962). The basic structure (subject to countless varia-
 tions) is that a group of people agree to meet at regular intervals,
 each making contributions of an agreed amount, creating a pool
 of savings that is then given in turn to the highest bidder. The
 right to bid is reserved to members who have not yet received the
 collected pool until finally each member of the group has re-
 ceived the pool once. This form of savings lottery is common in
 societies that possess a monetized economy yet do not have well-
 established modern financial institutions. Rotating credit lotter-
 ies reinforce community bonds while mobilizing savings. In so
 doing, they facilitate investment and the accumulation of capital.
 Biaohui have existed in China for hundreds of years and are
 still very popular in Taiwan today. According to a recent Ministry
 of Justice study (1985:302-4), 68% of adults in Taiwan had par-
 ticipated in biaohui, while 95% thought they were a very popular
 and widespread activity. In 1985, many informants declared that
 biaohui were not as popular as they once were because they rely
 on the strength of such traditional Chinese values as face and the
 importance of relationships, and those values were being eroded
 in contemporary Taiwanese society by the process of rapid eco-
 nomic development. In 1990, however, informants acknowl-
 edged that biaohui seemed as popular as ever but still predicted
 their imminent demise because of the general decline in moral
 standards. It is therefore difficult to determine whether biaohui
 are actually losing popularity. It is possible that the frequent as-
 sertion that biaohui are losing popularity should be interpreted
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 as an expression of disquiet at the rapid pace of social transfor-
 mation in Taiwanese society rather than as a factual observation.
 According to various informants, biaohui may be organized
 by friends, such as co-workers or neighbors, on a noncompetitive
 basis so that the collected pool of funds is received by each mem-
 ber in turn without bidding. They may also be organized on a
 very large scale by entrepreneurs raising the equivalent of ven-
 ture capital by drawing together a large group whose only com-
 mon interest is some connection to the organizer of the biaohui.
 Individuals may participate in biaohui to generate personal sav-
 ings, to participate in a social activity with friends, to raise money
 to meet unexpected expenses such as uninsured medical ex-
 penses, to ease sudden cash-flow problems in a business, to make
 a major purchase such as an automobile, or to make a down pay-
 ment on property (ROC Ministry of Justice 1985:95).
 Among the reasons given in response to the Ministry of Jus-
 tice survey for the popularity of biaohui were interest rates for
 investors that were higher than regulated financial institutions
 could offer; instant availability of funds; no parallel to the re-
 quirement usually imposed by regulated lenders that borrowers
 furnish either collateral or a surety; no troublesome procedures
 involved in launching a biaohui; and the lack of alternative
 sources of funds (ibid., p. 55). Another factor enhancing of the
 appeal of biaohui is that participants do not generally pay taxes
 on their earnings.19
 Most informants felt that while biaohui had been very popu-
 lar in the past, they would become less popular in the future for a
 variety of reasons. While many of the factors contributing to the
 continued popularity of biaohui are still significant, 83% of re-
 spondents to the Ministry of Justice survey were worried about
 the risk of failure of biaohui, 96% thought that failures of
 biaohui had a serious impact on society, and 81% thought that it
 was not uncommon for biaohui to fail before all participants had
 been awarded their turn to collect the pool (ibid., pp. 129-31).
 Respondents cited as reasons for the failure of biaohui economic
 slumps, lack of ethical standards among people in business,
 greed among members, and deterioration of the bonds of
 human relationships (ibid., p. 58).
 The rights and responsibilities of biaohui organizers and
 members are quite distinct and well defined. The organizer of a
 biaohui traditionally enjoys a major benefit from playing that
 role: the right to receive the first pool. In return, the biaohui
 organizer is expected to guarantee the performance of all other
 19 In an interview in 1990, a senior official in the Ministry of Finance's Department
 of Tax readily acknowledged the ROC authorities' inability to collect taxes on biaohui
 earnings, but he countered by pointing out that even in the United States, the Internal
 Revenue Service had trouble collecting taxes on wages paid babysitters (a prescient obser-
 vation in light of the recent Z6e Baird scandal).
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 biaohui members, taking over their share of the payments if they
 are unable to do so. The primary risk of loss to biaohui members
 arises from the fact that the biaohui organizer may not fulfil that
 obligation as guarantor if participation in the biaohui breaks
 down before all members have had their turn to receive the col-
 lected pool. For example, a participant whose primary interest is
 in earning a high return on her investment might permit all the
 participants in more urgent need of the credit and more willing
 to bid high interest rates20 to receive the collected pool first with
 a view to waiting to the end of the biaohui process. Such a partici-
 pant would enjoy the highest rate of return of all the participants
 by the time she finally collects the pool, unless the biaohui is not
 continued to completion, in which case that participant would
 suffer the greatest loss of principal. If the biaohui organizer and
 biaohui participants are members of the same networks of per-
 sonal connections, the risk of default by the biaohui organizer is
 minimized. If the participants do not know each other and have
 only a limited connection to the organizer, the risk of the
 biaohui organizer absconding is obviously greater.
 While the rights and liabilities of members of biaohui are not
 defined in ROC statutes or codes, two ROC Supreme Courtjudg-
 ments clarify the legal status of biaohui. In these precedents, the
 Court held that unless otherwise agreed by the members, biaohui
 consists of contracts between the organizer and each member,
 with no legal relationship existing among the members (1960
 Tai-Shang-Zi 1635; 1974 Tai-Shang-Zi 1159). Only in the event
 that the organizer fails to exercise his or her rights against de-
 faulting members can a member subrogate to the rights of the
 organizer and pursue recovery from other members (ROC Civil
 Code art. 242). The lack of a cause of action from a member who
 has made regular contributions but not yet received a turn at the
 collected pool and members who have had their turn is a major
 flaw in the regulation of biaohui, forcing frustrated members to
 either accept their losses or find nonlegal recourse against the
 other participants in the hui.
 2. Regulating and Deregulating Biaohui
 In the 1950s, the ROC authorities established a group of reg-
 ulated financial institutions known as "Mutual Savings and Loan
 Societies" or hehui gongsi. The hehui gongsi were in fact little
 more than aggregates of biaohui, in which the hehui gongsi
 played the part of biaohui organizer. According to bankers for-
 merly associated with hehui gongsi, company representatives,
 employed on a commission basis, went out to organize biaohui
 20 Interest rates may be expressed as either a discount off the regular contribution
 amount that other hui participants do not have to pay or as a premium over the regular
 contribution that the bidder will pay for the remainder of the hui.
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 among their family, friends, and acquaintances. Savers received
 the benefit of a corporation as guarantor that the biaohui would
 continue through completion while still enjoying interest rates
 above those offered on deposits by banks, and borrowers had a
 source of unsecured credit. The hehui gongsi were profitable
 and popular. Notwithstanding the success of the hehui gongsi as
 a decentralized, community-based financing vehicle, the manag-
 ers of the hehui gongsi began over time to shift their focus,
 bringing their practices more in line with those of commercial
 banks.
 According to former hehui gongsi managers, the first modifi-
 cation of hehui gongsi practices came when representatives
 stopped calling on biaohui members in the community and
 biaohui members were encouraged to come to an office of the
 hehui gongsi to make their periodic payments. Next, the pre-
 tense of organizing biaohui was gradually dropped, and instead
 schedules of payments and lump-sum returns were drawn up ap-
 proximating the experience of an individual member of a
 biaohui. Savers could choose among the various schedules based
 on their preferred duration of the savings plan and the periodic
 contribution they wished to make, and could switch from a sav-
 ings plan to a loan repayment format at any time. Savers were
 thus interacting directly with the hehui gongsi, but their experi-
 ence was virtually identical to that of participating in a large, im-
 personal biaohui.
 Hehui gongsi management favored eliminating their direct
 involvement with biaohui and becoming more like banks be-
 cause they wanted to compete with banks for business lending
 opportunities that had lower transaction costs to the institution
 than supervising actual biaohui. In attempting to lower their
 transaction costs on lending operations, the hehui gongsi man-
 agement adopted many of the standards used by commercial
 banks for screening loan applications, most notably in requiring
 that the borrower offer collateral, preferably in the form of real
 estate, or offer personal guarantors known to have substantial as-
 sets.
 While Taiwan had many commercial banks at that time, retail
 banking services tended to be limited to deposit taking and did
 not include much lending to individuals or small businesses. The
 hehui gongsi were thus providing services to a segment of the
 market that other banking institutions did not serve. By phasing
 out biaohui as a form of commercial credit and converting hehui
 gongsi into conventional banks, hehui gongsi managers and
 bank regulators eliminated one of the only significant sources of
 unsecured credit from a regulated financial institution available
 in Taiwan.
 This gradual progression from biaohui to conventional de-
 posit taking and lending practices was accelerated with the 1975
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 reform of the banking law. One objective behind the 1975 revi-
 sion was to "modernize" ROC banking. However, this led drafters
 of the legislation to simply remove references to biaohui financ-
 ing, as well as to qianzhuang (native Chinese banks; see
 McElderry 1976), since these were perceived as anachronisms in
 a modern banking system.
 The hehui gongsi were reorganized as small and medium
 business banks, whose only significant difference from other
 commercial banks was that they were restricted in the geographi-
 cal scope of their operations. According to managers of small
 and medium business banks who had started out as employees or
 managers of the hehui gongsi prior to their reorganization as
 banks, the new small and medium business banks were not pro-
 hibited from engaging in biaohui activities, but they were prohib-
 ited from expanding that type of business above 1975 levels and
 were denied licenses to conduct foreign exchange operations un-
 til they had phased out all biaohui activities.
 While the hehui gongsi appeared traditional and anachronis-
 tic to ROC bank regulators in 1975, there are certain structural
 similarities between their biaohui activities and the highly suc-
 cessful lending programs of the widely acclaimed Grameen Bank
 in Bangladesh (Huq & Sultan 1991:169), which was established
 about the same time the hehui gongsi were reorganized into
 banks in Taiwan. Grameen Bank programs are primarily
 designed to provide credit to indigent laborers to free them from
 the exploitation of moneylenders. The structure of those pro-
 grams emphasizes mutual support and accountability among
 members of small groups that qualify collectively for credit and
 foster savings as part of the loan repayment plans. The challenge
 faced by the Grameen Bank founders was to find a way to chan-
 nel credit to borrowers without any form of collateral and yet
 retain incentives to guarantee repayment. Their solution was to
 require borrowers to form groups in which the members each
 personally guarantee the credit of the others. The Grameen
 Bank programs have a substantial educational component and
 require members of borrowing groups to scrutinize one an-
 other's investment choices critically.
 The structural similarity between Grameen Bank programs
 and organized biaohui lies in the reliance on personal networks
 based on common economic interests as an alternative to collat-
 eral and in spreading the risks of business failure through those
 networks. The Grameen Bank programs are more interventionist
 than the hehui gongsi programs in Taiwan, however, and en-
 courage members of borrowers' groups not merely to rely on
 reputation in the community as a proxy for business acumen but
 to establish for themselves that the credit is being used pru-
 dently. In Taiwan, by contrast, government intervention in rela-
 tional business practices was limited to reinforcing the traditional
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 role of the biaohui organizer. By substituting a regulated finan-
 cial institution for an individual as the organizer of the biaohui,
 members of the hui faced less risk of loss in the event the hui was
 not carried through to completion because a regulated financial
 institution was by law the guarantor of all the members.
 Viewed only in terms of the reorganization of the hehui
 gongsi into banks, it would appear that the modernizing im-
 pulses of the ROC authorities and the rationalizing impulses of
 hehui gongsi management produced the desired result: The cli-
 ents of hehui gongsi were transformed from traditional biaohui
 participants into borrowers and depositors of modern banks.
 However, this completely overlooks the fact that if the elimina-
 tion of biaohui as a regulated form of credit was supposed to
 provide a disincentive to continued participation in biaohui (by
 increasing the risk of loss associated with participation), it was a
 complete failure. Rather, a successful and mutually beneficial
 link between localized and personalistic business practices and
 the ROC authorities was severed rather than nurtured. The
 biaohui is apparently as popular as ever but now takes place with-
 out any connection to any official agency, thus expanding the
 size of Taiwan's informal financial sector.
 The inability of ROC authorities to recognize that biaohui
 might be a cultural resource to be nurtured rather than an
 anachronism to be jettisoned as modernization progressed seems
 to be related not only to a narrow conception of modernization
 but also to the reluctance of legal professionals in Taiwan to in-
 voke law to facilitate traditional economic practices. This reluc-
 tance is diametrically opposed to the idea of economic regula-
 tion embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code, which
 envisages law as technique to facilitate and reflect the reasonable
 customary practices of merchants.21
 B. Postdated Checks
 A large component of Taiwan's informal financial sector is
 comprised of postdated check ("PDC") transactions (Winn
 1986). The popularity of the PDC as a financing vehicle stems
 from the fact that from 1960 to 1987 the ROC Negotiable Instru-
 ments Law ("NIL") provided criminal penalties for bouncing
 checks. The holder of a dishonored check could therefore initi-
 ate criminal proceedings against the drawer of the check, in ef-
 fect sentencing him or her to debtors' prison, with the costs of
 prosecution paid by the state rather than creditor.
 The intent of legislators in adding criminal penalties to
 checks but not to other negotiable instruments was to safeguard
 21 1990 Official Version Uniform Commercial Code ? 1-102(2)(b), provides: "Un-
 derlying purposes and policies of this Act are ... to permit the continued expansion of
 commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties."
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 the security of Taiwan's then-nascent modern payment system.
 The unintended consequence of adding criminal penalties was
 that the ROC legal system provided a cheap and effective tool
 creditors could use to reinforce otherwise precarious business re-
 lationships. Parties interacting through networks of relationships
 assumed they could verify the other party's good faith by simply
 asking for a PDC to document any extension of credit. The fear
 of criminal prosecution was used to supplement the more tradi-
 tional fear of loss of face that would follow any default on the
 debt. Using PDCs to document commercial transactions thus
 helped maintain the viability of attenuated relationships without
 forcing the parties to assume the expense and inconvenience of
 completely converting the transaction from a relational to a legal
 basis by drawing up a contract that fully expressed the parties'
 agreement.
 According to several informants interviewed in 1990, PDCs
 are still commonly issued by businesses needing short-term credit
 to purchase goods and services, even after the repeal of criminal
 penalties for bouncing checks. PDCs are either held by busi-
 nesses that can afford to wait until they become due or, if the
 party receiving a PDC in payment cannot afford to wait several
 weeks or months for payment, they are sold at a discount to
 banks or moneylenders. Regulated financial institutions such as
 banks regularly purchase PDCs at a discount, so these transac-
 tions are also significant in the formal financial system, but the
 ease of documentation associated with PDC transactions and
 ready transferability of PDCs makes them a popular form of fi-
 nance in the informal sector as well.
 Banks restricted access to checking accounts due to the spec-
 ter of criminal penalties looming as a consequence of miscalcu-
 lating the balance in one's checking account, thus preventing
 checks from gaining widespread use as a cash equivalent. Accord-
 ing to bankers, checking accounts were only made available to
 people in business and persons with substantial assets, while the
 average consumer in Taiwan paid cash for all purchases. Even
 after a customer agreed to open a checking account, banks ra-
 tioned the number of checks a customer could have at one time,
 waiting until one set of checks cleared before giving the cus-
 tomer a few more.
 Notwithstanding the restrictive posture adopted by banks in
 opening checking accounts, PDCs became very popular as a fi-
 nancing vehicle. As the economy of Taiwan grew rapidly during
 the 1970s and 1980s, and it became more difficult to do business
 exclusively with family and close friends, PDCs were used to bol-
 ster increasingly tenuous networks of connections. The assump-
 tion that few people would willingly risk incarceration as a cost of
 doing business gave people in business the confidence to do busi-
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 ness with people outside or only tangentially connected to their
 networks of personal relations.
 PDCs, however, were an imperfect substitute for the personal
 connections they supplemented or even replaced because deceit-
 ful borrowers devised various ruses to avoid suffering criminal
 penalties. Informants reported that people willing to engage in
 deliberately fraudulent practices such as exin daobi (bad faith
 business failures) would usually abscond long before criminal
 prosecution could begin, leaving those guilty of nothing more
 than bad business judgment to go to jail.22 In 1983, in the midst
 of a recession in the local economy, ROC officials estimated that
 up to 40% of the inmates in Taiwan's overcrowded prisons were
 serving sentences for writing bad checks (U.S. Department of
 State 1985:752).
 In spite of these shortcomings, PDCs became popular with
 informal lenders and borrowers as well as with regulated finan-
 cial institutions. Bankers even acknowledged requiring borrowers
 or lessees signing loan agreements or leases to provide the bank
 with a PDC for every payment due under the agreement at the
 time it was signed. A banker explained that they did this because
 prosecuting a bounced check was easier than suing in the event
 of default.
 If PDCs were an imperfect substitute for close personal con-
 nections with business partners, they were also an imperfect sub-
 stitute for modern financing techniques that focus on certain fi-
 nancial variables as indicators of profitability. For example, with
 cash-flow financing, the basis for extending credit is the esti-
 mated profitability of the business enterprise, not the assumption
 that the consequences following a default are so draconian that
 the business owners will take any steps to avoid default. The
 ready availability of criminal prosecution for loan defaults under-
 cut incentives to establish comprehensive credit reporting serv-
 ices, more reliable financial reporting by borrowers, or other ele-
 ments of a modern financial system. Punitive sanctions for
 bouncing checks were neither supporting the modernization of
 Taiwan's financial system-the original legislative intent-nor
 fostering the sound development of relational business practices,
 which might have been a more pragmatic objective.
 Although the addition of criminal penalties to checks con-
 tributed to the popularity of PDCs as a financing mechanism in
 Taiwan, the repeal of criminal penalties in 1987 did not have the
 catastrophic effect on business credit that some observers feared.
 This was because the repeal fortunately coincided with the end
 of the credit shortage Taiwan had suffered for over 30 years.
 According to informants in 1990, lenders continue to rely on
 PDCs as a financing vehicle, however, in part because Taiwan's
 22 See pt. II.C for further discussion of exin daobi.
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 check clearinghouse provides one of the few readily accessible,
 cheap sources of credit information available in Taiwan. The
 clearinghouse maintains comprehensive records of all bounced
 checks, including cross-references to major shareholders for
 company accounts, and will make the information available for a
 nominal charge to anyone with both a checking account number
 and the identification number assigned all individuals in Taiwan.
 In addition, bank members of the clearinghouse are required to
 close any accounts that have more than three bounced checks in
 a year, creating a strong incentive for account holders needing
 access to PDC financing not to bounce many checks. In transac-
 tions between friends, the holder of the check will permit the
 drawer of a check to exchange it for a new PDC if the drawer is
 unable to cover it when it becomes due rather than damage the
 friend's credit record by presenting it and letting it bounce.
 PDCs became important in part because they were used as a
 simple technique to reinforce the network structure of business
 as rapid industrialization and urbanization made interpersonal
 relationships increasingly attenuated. A legal device, criminal
 prosecution, was used to reduce the temptation to engage in
 fraud or other opportunistic behavior by parties no longer
 closely bound by ties of family or community. Because the legal
 system was invoked merely to reinforce relationships and to pun-
 ish parties unable to resolve problems within relational networks,
 the legal system remained a "marginalized" even though an es-
 sential element of the PDC informal financing system. That the
 legal regulation of PDCs was not central to the system is demon-
 strated by the continuing vitality of PDCs as an informal financ-
 ing technique after the repeal of criminal penalties. The simple,
 inexpensive credit reporting service provided by the check
 clearinghouse now seems to substitute for criminal penalties in
 maintaining the popularity of PDCs as an informal financing ve-
 hicle in Taiwan.
 C. Moneylenders and Daishu
 A significant segment of the informal financial system in Tai-
 wan is comprised of dixia qianzhuang or underground money-
 lenders. These moneylenders often have connections to organ-
 ized crime (Sheu 1990) and provide very short-term credit at
 high interest rates. This credit is not provided within the context
 of relationships but is based on strictly calculated, self-interested
 short-term transactions between the parties involved. Thus, while
 not legal, the structure of these transactions is highly legalistic,
 and sanctions are imposed by legal surrogates such as the gang-
 sters who provide these moneylending services or provide protec-
 tion to moneylenders.
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 This form of lending is considered part of the informal sector
 because such moneylenders may neither pay taxes on their in-
 come nor be licensed to engage in moneylending operations.
 They may also exceed the maximum interest rate permitted
 under the Civil Code of 20% (ROC Civil Code, Bk. II: Obliga-
 tions, art. 205) or in periods of tight credit even commit criminal
 usury, for which no rate is specified but which consists of taking
 advantage of another's need and charging an obviously excessive
 interest rate (ROC Criminal Code, art. 344).
 These moneylenders generally discount PDCs or take stock
 certificates or automobiles for collateral and lend only for a pe-
 riod of days or weeks. When asked if the repeal of the criminal
 penalties for checks had any impact on how he conducted his
 business, one moneylender responded that he had never relied
 on the criminal penalties but that he had "other ways" to make
 sure that people repaid their loans. Customers of these money-
 lenders may be struggling to cover outstanding PDCs or trying to
 cover gambling debts.
 One common way to locate an underground moneylender is
 through classified advertisements in newspapers. Telephone calls
 to ads in the Zili Wanbao (Independent Evening News) in June
 1990 revealed that for borrowers with a checking account, the
 interest rate to borrow the equivalent of several hundred U.S.
 dollars would be between 2% and 2.5% a month at a time when
 the prime rate quoted by commercial banks was around 10% per
 annum. If a car was offered as collateral, the amount lent would
 be more if the moneylender has possession of the car, or less if
 the borrower retains possession. While moneylenders who take
 collateral such as cars may do business out of a fixed location,
 moneylenders who only discount PDCs may arrange to deliver
 the loan proceeds to the borrower and refuse to disclose the lo-
 cation of the moneylending operation. When a government offi-
 cial was asked why underground moneylenders are able to con-
 duct such open and notorious operations without fear of
 prosecution, the official indicated that this practice of not dis-
 closing the location of their operations made them hard to pros-
 ecute.
 The financing services provided by dixia qianzhuang operate
 almost entirely outside the scope of the ROC legal system, con-
 tributing to the marginalization of the formal legal system, but
 rely on a draconian system of punishment that is at least quasi-
 legal in its severity. Underground moneylenders are not doing
 business on relational terms because their transactions are rela-
 tively short term and if the borrower fails to meet his or her obli-
 gations, the breach is resolved through harsh consequences, not
 an unstated agreement to accept some unspecified equivalent
 favor in the future. Thus the networks of relationships that are so
 common in Taiwanese society are not the exclusive technique for
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 organizing business transactions, but the alternative to relational
 networks is not always the moder formal legal system.
 Another significant form of informal finance associated pri-
 marily with real estate is provided by daishu, a profession that
 might be translated as "scrivener." As with moneylenders, these
 transactions are predominantly legalistic rather than relational in
 structure, but unlike transactions with underground moneylend-
 ers, the legalistic structure gives rise to rights upon default that
 can relatively quickly and easily be pursued within the ROC legal
 system.
 There are no licensing requirements to qualify as a daishu,
 and daishu are not permitted to draw up contracts or litigation
 papers. The only responsibility of daishu in Taiwan is to convey
 ownership of real estate, for which they may charge regulated
 fees. These fees are quite low by U.S. standards. In 1990, the fee
 to convey one unit of real property in Taipei was the equivalent
 of U.S.$200 and outside Taipei, U.S.$150. While it is not un-
 known for daishu to advance their own capital to help close a
 transaction, providing in effect a short-term bridge loan, it is
 more common for daishu to introduce prospective borrowers to
 lenders. Daishu can collect an unregulated commission of 1-3%
 for lining up informal credit for a prospective purchaser.
 Informal mortgage lenders, unlike underground moneylend-
 ers, are often just private persons with savings to invest rather
 than professional lenders. Borrowers may ask a daishu for an in-
 troduction to such a lender because informal lenders are usually
 willing to lend up to 80% or 90% of the purchase price of the
 property, while regulated lenders will not lend more 40% to
 60%. Banks are also unwilling to lend money for undeveloped
 land. Informal mortgage lenders usually only lend for 1 or 2
 years; a commercial bank might lend for 5 to 7 years. There is no
 equivalent of the 15- or 30-year residential mortgage in Taiwan.
 While commercial bank interest rates for real estate mort-
 gages in 1990 were around 12% per annum, an informal mort-
 gage lender might charge 2% or 3% a month. If a borrower de-
 faults, the informal mortgage lender must institute a foreclosure
 proceeding to recover the land. If the agreed interest rate is
 above the maximum legal rate, the lender will usually take the
 precaution of having the excess interest documented in a sepa-
 rate promissory note that is presented in the foreclosure pro-
 ceedings as a separate, unsecured obligation owed by the bor-
 rower to the lender to be paid after the mortgage has been
 satisfied in full. When asked why a court would not refuse to en-
 force such a contract as void, one magistrate pointed out that it
 would be very difficult for the borrower to prove it was for excess
 interest.
 The practice of informal mortgage lenders, unlike biaohui,
 depends on real property collateral rather than on networks of
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 connections except for the introduction provided by the daishu.
 While the informal mortgage transaction is legalistic in its struc-
 ture, in aggregate, informal mortgage transactions serve to frus-
 trate ROC authorities' attempts to regulate financial markets in
 Taiwan. Restrictions placed on mortgage lending by banks or
 other regulated lenders may not have the desired effect of damp-
 ening real estate speculation if a substantial volume of mortgage
 funds continues to flow through the offices of daishu.
 Mortgages arranged by daishu rely on elements of the ROC
 legal system in order to function, yet remain part of the informal
 economy because the terms of the mortgage may violate some
 laws. Thus the mere presence of elements of a legally enforcea-
 ble obligation does not guarantee that parties are aware that the
 transaction is regulated by law in its entirety. On the other hand,
 the popularity of such informal mortgages demonstrate that
 many Taiwanese may prefer investments protected by marginal-
 ized legal institutions to investments guaranteed by nothing
 more than relational sanctions.
 III. Mobilizing Relational Resources through Law
 Although the ROC legal system is currently marginalized in
 many realms of social and economic interaction by networks of
 relationships or legal surrogates, it is not clear that it will remain
 so in the future. Many observers of the ROC legal system might
 accept the label "marginalized" for the current operation of the
 system while insisting that the modernization process is well un-
 derway and that with further progress, the legal system will even-
 tually come to play the central, universal ordering role generally
 associated with modern legal systems. That outcome is far from
 inevitable, however, and a more realistic agenda for future devel-
 opment of the formal legal system in a society principally consti-
 tuted by networks of relationships might be to selectively rein-
 force or undermine those network structures in accordance with
 more general public policies, rather than to displace them alto-
 gether.
 A. Relational Capital and Relational Entrepreneurs
 Given that Taiwanese society, while showing signs of increas-
 ing individualism and other indicators of modernization, still re-
 lies heavily on relational practices in ordering commercial trans-
 actions, an official policy of promoting those relationships might
 facilitate economic development better than a policy of re-
 pressing them. The network structure of Chinese society might
 seem to be an impediment to increasing the effectiveness of the
 formal legal system; yet the considerable human investment in
 the creation and maintenance of those networks is a social re-
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 source within Taiwanese society that has arguably contributed to
 Taiwan's rapid economic development to date.
 The social investment in networks of relationships might be
 thought of as a form of "relational capital," drawing an analogy
 to concepts like human capital (Becker 1964) or symbolic capital
 (Bourdieu 1977). The economist Gary Becker coined the term
 "human capital" to account for the relationship between educa-
 tion, on-the-job training, and variations in earnings over time
 and with age. The social theorist Pierre Bourdieu developed the
 concept of symbolic capital to designate productive capacity ac-
 cumulated in the form of authority, knowledge, reputation, or
 relationships but that may be converted to capital assets recog-
 nized by economists. In Taiwan, the large investment of social
 resources in teaching individuals the importance of human rela-
 tions creates a framework within which relational practices take
 place. Relational capital serves an economic purpose because,
 once established, it should lower the transaction costs of parties
 doing business through interpersonal networks. The types of
 transaction costs that might be reduced include evaluating the
 integrity of a potential colleague, comparison shopping for bet-
 ter quality or price terms, fully specifying of all terms of an agree-
 ment in advance, or designing and implementing monitoring sys-
 tems.
 Although the decision of the parties to do business through
 relationships constitutes a departure from conditions of market
 competition, it need not result in the kind of inefficient alloca-
 tion of resources associated with monopoly or oligopoly. If the
 terms of the ongoing relationship are fair to all the parties, the
 resulting distribution of resources through relationships may ap-
 proximate the competitive free-market result (Kenney & Klein
 1983).
 Since the functions of formal political, economic, and legal
 institutions are merged in the activities of various participants in
 the informal sector, a concept such as "relational entrepreneur"
 could be developed to describe the activity of individuals who,
 like impresarios, orchestrate the networks of relationships that
 constitute the informal sector. The rationality of relational entre-
 preneurs could be compared to the rationality of managers,
 workers, politicians, voters, judges, and others as analyzed in con-
 ventional Western social sciences.
 B. Relational Practices and Democratic Theory
 The idea that relational practices might displace or marginal-
 ize formal legal institutions in commercial transactions may not
 pose a problem from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, but
 given the centrality of concepts like the rule of law to Western
 ideas of democracy, it raises profoundly troubling issues of polit-
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 ical legitimacy. Liberal democratic theory assumes law is needed
 to check abuses of power in modern society, and the appeal of
 constraints grounded in a very legalistic concept of legitimacy
 such as fundamental human rights cannot be lightly dismissed.
 Even if relational practices can be proven to be as effective in
 ordering commercial transactions as more legalistic alternatives,
 they may not prevent abuses of power in a society where modern
 legal institutions are marginalized and social norms are highly
 contextualized.
 Whether a theory of modern political legitimacy in a pre-
 dominantly relational society will evolve for Taiwan may depend
 on whether the type of relational practices described in this arti-
 cle are just a transitory phenomenon in the modernization pro-
 cess or are indicative of deep structural differences between
 Western and non-Western societies. From the information gath-
 ered for this preliminary study, it is impossible to predict what
 the future holds for Taiwan. Taiwanese society may become more
 stereotypically modern, and the propensity to organize social
 interaction through relationships will be displaced by individ-
 ualistic, rule-governed behavior (Yang 1988). Or Taiwanese soci-
 ety may continue to fuse remnants of traditional Chinese society
 with elements of modern society in a distinctly non-Western way.
 Perhaps the most intriguing possibility is that Taiwanese soci-
 ety and modern Western societies will tend to converge at some
 point that is now still foreign to both, with Taiwanese society be-
 coming less relational and more individualistic, and Western so-
 cieties continuing to move away from the constructs of 19th-cen-
 tury liberalism toward a more self-consciously contextualized,
 fluid social structure. Not only relational contract theorists (Ma-
 caulay 1963) but feminists (West 1988) and advocates of "multi-
 culturalism" (Takaki 1993) have argued that American society is
 neither as individualistic nor as legalistic as it is often portrayed.
 More economists and sociologists are attempting to recognize
 the "embeddedness" of individuals in their social environment in
 their studies of economic and social activities (Granovetter
 1985). If convergence between Taiwanese and Western societies
 takes place in some form not now recognized in either society,
 then the need for a political theory that can distinguish legiti-
 mate and illegitimate relational practices will be a concern not
 just for Taiwan but for societies that now invoke the ideal of the
 rule of law for their legitimacy.
 IV. Conclusion
 There is a significant relationship between Taiwan's rapid
 economic development and indigenous Taiwanese social prac-
 tices and ideas about law. This relationship has generally been
 misconstrued or overlooked by much of the academic literature
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 19:02:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 228 Rational Practices and the Marginalization of Law
 discussing Taiwan's economic "miracle." Networks of interper-
 sonal relationships have played a significant role in promoting
 economic development, while the ROC legal system has often
 been reduced to a role of enabling those relationships rather
 than establishing the kind of universal normative order often as-
 sociated with the idea of a modern legal system. A substantial
 component of Taiwan's economic development has taken place
 in the informal sector, outside the purview of the ROC legal sys-
 tem. This study is the first attempt to develop a systematic ac-
 count of the marginalization of Taiwan's modern legal system
 and the concomitant heightened significance of alternatives,
 such as networks of personal connections or informal surrogates
 for legal regulation, in contributing to Taiwan's rapid economic
 development.
 The role played by the ROC legal system in indirectly sup-
 porting relational practices is not one that can readily be ex-
 pressed in terms of legal theories constructed to account for the
 relationship between law and development in Western nations.
 The conflict between contemporary Taiwanese social reality and
 liberal-democratic theory, when recognized, is usually followed
 by exhortations for the Taiwanese system to further modernize,
 thus resolving any conflict in favor of the Western model (e.g.,
 Chai 1990; Liu 1990:214; Hsu 1985:328). If, however, Taiwan's
 system is not so much moving toward convergence with Western
 models as developing along alternative lines, then analyzing how
 formal legal institutions in Taiwan are marginalized may better
 explain processes of economic development and democratiza-
 tion in many nations outside the Western legal and political tra-
 dition.
 Appendix 1. Methodology
 The interviews upon which this study is based were primarily con-
 ducted during four trips to Taiwan. In 1986, I conducted 31 interviews
 with managers and lending officers at foreign and local banks, govern-
 ment officials involved in financial regulation and local attorneys. The
 primary focus of these interviews was the failure of the court-ordered
 company reorganization process in Taiwan in the early 1980s (Winn
 1988). The high degree of informal economic activity among local busi-
 nesses was often cited by respondents as a major factor in the failure of
 the reorganization process. During a brief visit in 1987, I interviewed
 other government officials concerning the problems of regulating fi-
 nancial institutions in Taiwan in light of the size of the informal finan-
 cial sector.
 In 1990, I conducted 65 interviews with lawyers, judges, business
 people, bank officers, government officials involved in tax collection
 and licensing business enterprises, academics studying related issues,
 and one gang member. In 1991, I conducted 19 additional interviews.
 Some were follow-up interviews with parties already interviewed on an
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 19:02:50 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Winn 229
 earlier occasion. Others were with managers at small and medium en-
 terprise banks or government officials charged with regulating those
 banks. In those interviews, I pursued information on the actual conduct
 of informal financial practices and the responses of regulators to those
 practices. In addition, I sought to develop a definition of the informal
 sector in Taiwan, to gather evidence on how participants in the infor-
 mal sector conducted their business and to determine to what degree
 informal practices diverged from practices of regulated businesses.
 While obstacles to collecting unbiased information on informal or
 extralegal activity are present in any society, they are compounded in
 the case of Taiwan by a high degree of reluctance to be open with stran-
 gers. This is due not only to cultural norms that stress the exchange of
 information within existing relationships (Hwang 1987), but also to the
 legacies of martial law and to a very repressive internal security appara-
 tus (Meany 1992:101). Martial law was established by the ROC govern-
 ment on mainland China in 1937, brought to Taiwan with retrocession
 from Japan in 1945 and was effectively repealed in 1987. However, the
 National Security Law enacted in 1987 preserves some important fea-
 tures of the former martial law regime, so the people of Taiwan still do
 not enjoy complete freedom in the exercise of civil liberties.
 Given these obstacles concerning mistrust of strangers and difficul-
 ties acquiring a random sample of informants, a practical alternative
 was to mobilize relationships with trusting local informants. I believe
 that those I interviewed represent a diverse, well-informed sample of
 people in Taiwan with first-hand knowledge of the workings of the in-
 formal sector and of official attempts to regulate informal economic
 activity. However, because all interviews took place in Taipei, the capital
 of Taiwan province, the sample may not accurately reflect conditions in
 smaller municipalities or rural areas in Taiwan.
 Appendix 2. Rendering Chinese Ideographs in
 Romanized Form
 The problem of rendering Chinese ideographs into a romanized
 form raises several issues worth noting. In this article, the Pinyin roman-
 ization system developed in the People's Republic of China will be used
 unless a Chinese word has been conventionally rendered in another
 romanization system or it is the name of a person who has adopted a
 particular romanization for his or her name. The choice of the Pinyin
 romanization system is problematic with regard to discussions of Tai-
 wan because it is not among the several romanization systems actually
 in use in Taiwan, such as the Wade-Giles, Yale and Kuoyu Chuyinfuhao
 systems. It was chosen for use in this article, however, because it is the
 most widely used romanization system outside Taiwan, and therefore
 most likely to be familiar to readers of this article, and because there is
 no single authoritative system among the several in use in Taiwan.
 Thus, familiar names such as Taipei or Hung Yuan are not rendered in
 Pinyin (viz., Taibei or Hong Yuan) but less well known Chinese words
 are rendered in Pinyin (e.g. biaohui rather than piaohui in Wade-Giles,
 biaohwei in Yale, or biauhuei in Kuoyu Chuyinfuhao).
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